blockchain computer provides a secure, performant and exible consensus mechanism. While rst de ned for a permissioned participation model, the consensus mechanism itself can be paired with any method of Sybil resistance (e.g. proof-of-work or proof-of-stake) to create an open participation model. D 's greatest strength is unfolded in the most challenging proof-of-stake case.
e D blockchain computer provides a secure, performant and exible consensus mechanism. While rst de ned for a permissioned participation model, the consensus mechanism itself can be paired with any method of Sybil resistance (e.g. proof-of-work or proof-of-stake) to create an open participation model. D 's greatest strength is unfolded in the most challenging proof-of-stake case.
At its core, D contains a decentralized randomness beacon which acts as a veri able random function (VRF) that produces a stream of outputs over time. e novel technique behind the beacon relies on the existence of a unique-deterministic, non-interactive, DKG-friendly threshold signatures scheme. e only known examples of such a scheme are pairing-based and derived from BLS [3, 10] .
e D blockchain is layered on top of the D beacon and uses the beacon as its source of randomness for leader selection and leader ranking. A "weight" is a ributed to a chain based on the ranks of the leaders who propose the blocks in the chain, and that weight is used to select between competing chains. e D blockchain is further hardened by a notarization process which dramatically improves the time to nality and eliminates the nothing-at-stake and sel sh mining a acks. D 's consensus algorithm is made to scale through continuous quorum selections driven by the random beacon. In practice, D achieves block times of a few seconds and transactionnality a er only two con rmations. e system gracefully handles temporary losses of network synchrony including network splits, while it is provably secure under synchrony. 
PROLOGUE
DFINITY is a decentralized network design whose protocols generate a reliable "virtual blockchain computer" running on top of a peer-to-peer network upon which so ware can be installed and can operate in the tamperproof mode of smart contracts. e goal is for the virtual computer to nalize computations quickly (using short block times and by requiring only a small number of blocks as Technology Overviews, DFINITY Sti ung © 2016 ACM.
is is the author's version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. e de nitive Version of Record was published in Proceedings of Technology Overview Series, Jan. 23, 2018, h p://dx.doi.org/10.1145/ nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn. "con rmations"), to provide predictable performance (by keeping the time between con rmations approximately constant), and for computational and storage capacity to scale up without bounds as demand for its services increases (using novel validation mechanisms and sharding systems discussed in our other papers). e protocols must be secure against an adversary controlling less than a certain critical proportion of its nodes, must generate cryptographic randomness (which is required by advanced decentralized applications) and must maintain a decentralized nature as it grows in size to millions of nodes. D will be introduced in a series of technology overviews, each highlighting an independent innovation in D such as the consensus backbone, smart contract language, virtual machine, concurrent contract execution model, daemon contracts, peer-topeer networks and secure broadcast, governance mechanism and scaling techniques. e present document will focus on the consensus backbone and cryptographic randomness. D has an unbiasable, veri able random function (VRF) built-in at the core of its protocol.
e VRF not only drives the consensus, it will also be the foundation for scaling techniques such as sharding, validation towers, etc. Moreover, the VRF produced by the consensus layer is available to the application layer, i.e., to the smart contracts and virtual machine. In this way, the consensus backbone is intertwined with many of the other topics.
D
's consensus mechanism has four layers as depicted in Fig. 1 . e rst layer provides registered and Sybil-resistant client identities. On the second layer is a decentralized random beacon. On the third layer is a blockchain that is driven by the random beacon through a probabilistic mechanism for leader ranking. On the fourth layer is a decentralized notary that provides timestamping and publication guarantees, and is ultimately responsible for near-instant nality. D 's consensus layers and other key aspects of the consensus mechanism can be summarized in the following main categories.
1st layer: Identities and Registry. e active participants in the D network are called clients. All clients in D are registered, i.e., have permanent, pseudonymous identities. e registration of clients has advantages over the typical proof-of-work blockchains where it is impossible to link di erent blocks to the same miner. For example, if registration requires a security deposit, a misbehaving client would lose its entire deposit, whereas a miner in a typical proof-of-work blockchain would only forego the block reward during the time of misbehavior. As a result, the penalty for misbehavior can be magnitudes larger for registered identities than it can be for unregistered identities. is is particularly important as blockchains can track unbounded external value that exceeds the value of the native token itself. Moreover, D supports open membership by providing a protocol to register new clients via a stake deposit with a lock-up period. is is the responsibility of the rst layer.
2nd layer: Random Beacon. e random beacon in the second layer is an unbiasable, veri able random function (VRF) that is produced jointly by registered clients. Each random output of the VRF is unpredictable by anyone until just before it becomes available to everyone. is is a key technology of the D system which relies on a threshold signature scheme with the properties of uniqueness and non-interactivity. e BLS signature scheme is the only practical 1 scheme that can provide these features, and D has a particularly optimized implementation of BLS built in [2, 11] . Using a threshold mechanism for randomness creation solves the fundamental "last actor" problem. Any decentralized protocol for creating public randomness without a threshold mechanism su ers from the problem that the last actor in that protocol knows the next random value and can decide to abort the protocol. 3rd layer: Blockchain and fork resolution. e third layer deploys the "probabilistic slot protocol" (PSP). is protocol ranks the clients for each height of the chain, in an order that is derived deterministically from the unbiased output of the random beacon for that height. A weight is then assigned to block proposals based on the proposer's rank such that blocks from clients at the top of the list receive a higher weight. Forks are resolved by giving favor to the "heaviest" chain in terms of accumulated block weight -quite similar to how traditional proof-of-work consensus is based on the highest accumulated amount of work. e rst advantage of the PSP protocol is that the ranking is available instantaneously, which allows for a predictable, constant block time. e second advantage is that there is always a single highest-ranked client which allows for a homogenous network bandwidth utilization. Instead, a race between clients would favor a usage in bursts.
4th layer: Notarization and near-instant finality. Finality of a given transaction means a system-wide consensus that a given transaction has been irreversibly executed. While most distributed systems require rapid transaction nality, existing blockchain techniques are unable to provide it. D deploys the novel technique of block notarization in its fourth layer to speed up nality. A notarization is a threshold signature under a block created jointly by registered clients. Only notarized blocks can be included in a chain. Of all the block candidates that are presented to a client for notarization, the client only notarizes the highest-ranked one with respect to a publicly veri able ranking algorithm driven by the random beacon. It is important to emphasize that notarization is not consensus because it is possible, due to adverse timing, for more than one block to get notarized at a given height.
is is explicitly tolerated and an important di erence to other proof-ofstake proposals that apply full Byzantine agreement at every block. D achieves its high speed and short block times exactly because notarization is not full consensus. However, notarization can be seen as optimistic consensus because it will frequently be the case that only one block gets notarized. Whether this is the case can be detected a er one subsequent block plus a relay time (cf. eorem 9.3). Hence, whenever the broadcast network functions normally a transaction is nal in the D consensus a er two notarized con rmations plus a network traversal time.
We like to emphasize that a notarization in D is not primarily a validity guarantee but rather a timestamp plus a proof of publication. e notarization step makes it impossible for the adversary to build and sustain a chain of linked, notarized blocks in secret. For this reason, D does not su er from the sel sh mining a ack [4] or the nothing-at-stake problem.
Threshold Relay and Network Scalability. D 's consensus is designed to operate on a network of millions of clients. To enable scalability to this extent, the random beacon and notarization protocols are designed such that they can be safely and e ciently delegated to a commi ee. A commi ee is a randomly sampled subset of all registered clients that deploys a threshold mechanism (for safety) that is moreover non-interactive (for e ciency).
In D , the active commi ee changes regularly. A er having temporarily executed the protocol on behalf of all clients, the commi ee relays the execution to another pre-con gured commi ee. We call this technique " reshold Relay" in D .
Consistency vs availability. It is worth noting that network splits are implicitly detectable by D and are handled conservatively. is is a consequence of the random sampling of commi ees. If the network splits in two halves of more or less the same size, this will automatically cause the random beacon to pause within a few blocks so that none of the sides can continue. e random beacon will automatically resume once the network reconnects. If the network splits in a way that one component is signi cantly larger than half of the network, the protocol may continue in that one large component but will pause in all other components.
Network splits can not only occur when the communication is interrupted. Another important and even more realistic case is when there are multiple implementations of the D client and they disagree due to the exposures of a bug. D handles this case gracefully. If there are two clients in evenly widespread use and they start to disagree, then both clients will pause. If there are many evenly spread clients and one starts to disagree from all the others, then the network will likely continue and only the isolated client will pause. is is exactly the desired behavior in the given scenarios. Other blockchains do not handle this case well and the occurrence of such an event poses a real threat to them. e reason is that these chains put too much emphasis on availability rather than consistency.
Paper organization. § 3 presents a high-level view of the protocol. § 4 speci es our system, communication and threat models and introduces relevant notations. § 5-7 describe the probabilistic slot protocol and random beacon protocol in detail. § 8.1 introduces the reshold Relay technique which allows the protocols to be safely executed by pre-con gured commi ees rather than by all replicas. § 8.2 describes the open participation model which allows members to join and leave the protocol over time. Finally, § 9 provides the security and correctness proofs for the D protocol.
A HIGH-LEVEL VIEW OF THE CONSENSUS PROTOCOL
Roles. e D peer-to-peer network consists of clients connected by a broadcast network over which they can send messages to everyone. Clients ful ll three active functions: (a) participate in the decentralized random beacon, (b) participate in the decentralized notary, (c) propose blocks. Clients also observe blocks and build their own view of the nalized chain.
Commi ees and Threshold Relay. To improve scalability, the random beacon and notary are run by a commi ee. In a small scale network the commi ee can be the set of all clients. In a large scale network, the commi ee is smaller than the set of all clients and changes from round to round (i.e., from block to block). e random beacon output in one round chooses the commi ee for the next round according to the threshold relay technique described in § 8.1.
e commi ee size is con gured based on a failure probability calculation (see § 4.2.4).
Block ranking. If we abstract away the decentralized aspect of the random beacon and notary then the consensus protocol is depicted in Fig. 2 . e protocol proceeds in rounds such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the round number and the position (called height) in the chain. At the beginning of round r , the randomness beacon produces a fresh, veri able random value and broadcasts it to the network (Fig. 2, step 1 ). e random beacon output for round r , denoted by ξ r , determines a priority ranking of all registered clients. Any client can propose a block but a higher priority level of the client means a higher chance that the block will get notarized and that block makers in the subsequent round will build on top of it.
Notarization. Once a client sees a valid ξ r , it pools transactions collected from users into a block candidate and sends it to the notary (Fig. 2, step 2 ). e notary waits for a speci c constant time (BlockTime) to receive the proposed blocks. en, the notary runs the ranking mechanism based on the random beacon, chooses the highest-ranked block, and signs and broadcasts it (Fig. 2, step 3) . As soon as clients receive a notarized block, they use it to extend their copies of the blockchain thereby ending round r in their respective views. Finally, the random beacon broadcasts ξ r +1 which marks the beginning of a new round.
Decentralized Random Beacon. e random beacon protocol is completely decentralized and operated by all clients in the committee together. Nevertheless from the outside (i.e., looking only at the outputs produced and the timing of the outputs), the beacon behaves like a trusted third party. We emphasize that the committee does not need to run a Byzantine agreement protocol for every output that the beacon produces. Instead, agreement on each of the beacon's output is automatic because of the uniqueness property of our threshold signature scheme. is explains how the random beacon can run at such high speed, and thereby the D blockchain can achieve such a low block time.
Decentralized Notary. As was the case for the random beacon, the notary is completely decentralized and operated by all clients in the commi ee together and its behavior as a whole can be equated to a trusted third party. However, unlike the random beacon, the notary seeks to agree on live input -a block -rather than on a pseudorandom number. ere is no "magic" cryptography available for this, so a full Byzantine agreement protocol would be the only option. But instead of doing that, the D notary merely runs an optimistic protocol which achieves consensus "under normal operation" though may sometimes notarize more than one block per round. If this happens, D 's chain ranking algorithm will resolve the fork and nality can be achieved in a subsequent normal round. e optimistic protocol is non-interactive and fast, hence the notary can run at the same speed as the random beacon.
4 MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES 4.1 System Model 4.1.1 Replicas. From now on we speak of clients as replicas and label them 1, 2, . . . ∈ N. Let U be the nite set of labels of all replicas, called the universe. Each replica i ∈ U has a public/private key pair (pk i , sk i ). We assume the set {pk i | i ∈ U } is known and agreed upon 2 by all i ∈ U .
Authentication.
Each protocol message is signed by the replica that issues the message. e replicas only accept and act upon a message if the message is signed by one of the sk i , i ∈ U .
4.1.3 Groups. At any given time, some or all i ∈ U are arranged into one or more subsets G 1 , G 2 , . . . ⊆ U called groups, of which a single one, the commi ee, is active to drive progress and ensure consensus. We assume all groups G j have the same size n. e number n is a system parameter called the group size.
Synchrony.
For the practical use of D we assume a semi-synchronous network by which we mean that the network traversal time can be modeled by a random variable Y whose probability distribution is known. e D protocol then chooses two system-wide timeout constants BlockTime and T based on the distribution of Y and the security parameter of the system. In the formal security analysis in § 9 we give proofs for the synchronous case in which an upper bound ∆ for Y is known.
e two constants are responsible for liveness (BlockTime) and safety (T ) of the system, respectively. Timeout clocks are triggered based on local events, i.e. received messages. e protocol does not depend on a global time nor does it assume synchronized clocks between the replicas. e system evolves in rounds. Replicas advance to the next round based on events. e rounds are not expected to be in sync across di erent replicas.
reat Model

Byzantine replicas.
A replica that faithfully follows the protocol is called honest and all other replicas are called Byzantine. A Byzantine i ∈ U may behave arbitrarily, e.g., it may refuse to participate in the protocol or it may collude with others to perform a coordinated a ack the system.
Adversarial strength. For any
e value 1/β is called the adversarial strength. In practice, Assumption 1 is achieved through economic incentives in conjunction with a form of Sybil resistance. 3 4.2.3 Honest groups. Let n be the group size. en a group G is called honest if
e protocols described in § 5-7 rely on A 2. Each group G used in the system is honest.
Random samples.
Given Assumption 1, the universe U itself is honest. Each group G ⊆ U used in the system is a random sample of size n drawn from U . Given n, the probability Prob[G honest] can be calculated as follows: P 4.1. Let CDF hg (x, n, M, N ) denote the cumulative distribution function of the hypergeometric probability distribution where N is the population size, M is the number of successes 4 in the population, n is the sample size and x is the maximum number of successes allowed per sample. en
Given an acceptable failure probability ρ, we can solve (4.3) for the minimal group size n = n(β, ρ, |U |) such that As the population size increases to in nity the hypergeometric distribution converges to the binomial distribution. us, as |U | increases to in nity we get P 4.2. Let CDF binom (x, n, p) denote the cumulative distribution function of the binomial probability distribution where p is the success probability per draw, n is the sample size and x is the maximum number of successes allowed per sample. en
Given ρ, we can solve (4.4) for n and get the minimal group size n(β, ρ) such that n(β, ρ) ≥ n(β, ρ, |U |) for all values of |U |.
e result for di erent values for ρ and β are shown in Figure 4 below. As one can see, within the range of interest for ρ, the group size is approximately linear in − log 2 ρ. e resulting group sizes are practical for the protocols described in this paper. 5 4.2.5 Adaptive adversary. We assume that the adversary is mildly adaptive. is means the adversary may adaptively corrupt groups but this corruption takes longer than the activity period of the group. 4 In our application M is the number of Byzantine replicas in U . 5 e main protocols described in this paper are so-called "non-interactive". Group sizes of 1,000 have been tested in implementations and were proven to be unproblematic. D plans to launch its network with group sizes in the order of 400.
− log 2 ρ n(β, ρ) β = 3 β = 4 β = 5  40  423  173  111  64  701  287  185  80  887  363  235  128 1447 593 383 Figure 4 : Minimal group size for arbitrarily large U . Example values for the minimal group size n(β, ρ) for adversarial strength 1/β and failure probability ρ.
Cryptographic Primitives
4.3.1 Hash function. We assume we have a collision-resistant hash function H with digests of bit-length l where l matches the security parameter κ.
Pseudo-random numbers.
We also assume we have a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator PRG which turns a seed ξ into a sequence of values PRG(ξ , i) for i = 0, 1, . . ..
4.3.3
Pseudo-random permutations. e sequence PRG(ξ , i) can be used as input to the Fisher-Yates shu e [9, Algorithm 3.4.2P] to produce a random permutation of U . e result is an bijective map {1, . . . , |U |} → U which we denote by Perm U (ξ ).
Di ie-Hellman.
We assume that the adversary is bounded computationally and that the computational Di e-Hellman problem is hard for the elliptic curves with pairings in [2] .
D 's Block Chain
We now de ne formally the concept of a blockchain in D .
Blocks.
De nition 4.3.
A block is either a special genesis block or a tuple (p, r , z, d, o) where p ∈ {0, 1} l is the hash reference to the previous block, r ∈ N is the round number, z ∈ {0, 1} * is the notarization of the previous block, d ∈ {0, 1} * is the data payload ("transactions" and "state"), o ∈ U is the creator (or "owner"). A notarization is a signature on the previous block created by a "notary". For a block
We emphasize that a block contains the notarization z of the previous block in the chain that it references.
Chains.
De nition 4.4. By a chain C we mean a nite sequence of blocks (B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B r ) with rd B i = i for all i, prv B i = H (B i−1 ) for all i > 0, and nt B i a valid signature of B i−1 for all i > 0.
e rst block B 0 is a genesis block. e last block B r is called the head of C. We de ne len C := r + 1, gen C := B 0 , head C := B r .
Since blocks in a chain are linked through cryptographic hashes, a chain is an authenticated data structure. A chain is completely determined by its head by virtue of P 4.5. It is computationally infeasible to produce two chains C C with head C = head C .
De nition 4.6. We write C(B) for the uniquely de ned chain C with head C = B. Given two chains C, C we write C ≤ C if C is a pre x of C .
Assume from now on that all chains have the same genesis block B 0 .
De nition 4.7. For any non-empty set S of blocks we denote by C(S) the largest common pre x of all chains C(B) with B ∈ S.
e chain C(S) is de ned because every C(B), B ∈ S, contains the genesis block. For any sets of blocks S,T with S ⊆ T we have
(4.5)
PROBABILISTIC SLOT PROTOCOL AND NOTARIZATION
As was explained in § 3, each protocol round runs through the steps of producing a random beacon output (1), producing block proposals (2), and producing block notarizations (3). Since more than one block can get notarized, these steps alone do not provide consensus. is is where the probabilistic slot protocol (PSP) steps in.
Based on block weight, the PSP allows replicas to decide which chain to build on when they propose a new block. Over time, this leads to probabilistic consensus on a chain pre x, where the probability of nality increases the more "weight" is added to a chain.
is is analogous to proof-of-work chains, where the probability of nality increases the more "work" is added to a chain. However, D does not stop here and does not rely on this probabilistic type of nality decisions. PSP is only used to guide the block proposers. For nality, D applies a faster method utilizing a notarization protocol. For this section, we assume the random beacon (which we introduce later in § 7) is working without failure and provides all replicas with a new, unbiased random value ξ r at the start of each round r . Figure 5 shows how the protocol alternates between extending the blockchain and extending the random beacon chain and demonstrates how the random beacon, block proposer and notary advance in lockstep.
For the exposition of the present section, however, the decentralized nature and precise inner workings of the random beacon are irrelevant. Hence we simply regard the sequence ξ r as given without making further assumptions about it.
Regarding the threat model, we assume (4.2) for all groups, as stated in Assumption 2. However, for the description and understanding of the notarization protocol it is su cient to assume that there is only a single group consisting of the universe of replicas U and that
For simplicity of exposition we do adopt this view. It may then be apparent that the protocol described in this section can be delegated to any honest commi ee or sequence of honest commi ees.
Block Rank and Chain Weight
Based on ξ r , the protocol assigns a rank to each i ∈ U and the rank of the proposer de nes the weight of a block as follows.
In round r , a block B r is being proposed by a block maker that is prioritized by ξ r . B r references the previous block B r −1 . Members of the notary committee, which is selected by ξ r , sign o B r .
B r has received signature from a majority of replicas and is now notarized by virtue of the aggregated signature z r . Every replica enters round r + 1 upon seeing z r .
Members of the random beacon committee, which is selected by ξ r , sign the previous randomness ξ r right a er entering round r + 1.
4. e next random beacon output ξ r +1 is formed as a unique threshold signature. e cycle continues with step 1 for round r + 1. accumulates the weights of its blocks (here shown only for blocks starting at round r − 3). A replica with this view will resolve between the two forks that are still active at round r and will choose to build on the heavier one: C 1 .
De nition 5.1 (Replica Ranking).
e ranking permutation for round r is de ned as π r := Perm U (ξ r ). e rank of i ∈ U in round r is de ned as π r (i).
De nition 5.2 (Block Ranking).
e rank of a block B is de ned as rk B := π r (own B) where r = rd B. We say B has higher priority level than B if rk B < rk B .
If an adversary equivocates then there will be multiple blocks for the same round with the same rank.
We assume the protocol has de ned a monotonically decreasing function w. In particular, for D we instantiate w as w(x) = 2 −x .
De nition 5.3 (Block Weight).
e weight of a block B is de ned as wt B := w(rk B).
De nition 5.4 (Chain Weight).
e weight of a chain C = (B 0 , . . . , B r ) is de ned as wt C := r h=0 wt B h . We call C heavier than another chain C if wt C > wt C .
Block Proposals
At each round each replica can propose a block. To do so, in round r + 1, the replica selects the heaviest valid 6 chain C with len C = r in its view (cf. Fig. 6 ).
e replica then considers all new transactions that it has received from users. e new proposed block B r references head C and is composed of the selected transactions.
e replica broadcasts B r in order to request notarization from the notary commi ee.
Block Notarization
e goal of notarization is to enforce that chains are only being built from blocks that were published during their respective round, not later. In other words, notarization prevents that an adversary can build a private con icting chain and reveal it later. Blocks that are revealed too late cannot get notarized anymore, so that the timely publication of block proposals is enforced. A notarization is therefore regarded as a timestamp as well as a proof of publication.
e protocol guarantees to notarize at least one of multiple proposed chain heads for the current round. It a empts to notarize exactly one chain head for each round but does not guarantee that.
erefore, notarization does not imply consensus nor does it require consensus.
When participating in the notarization protocol the replicas are only concerned about extending at least one valid chain, not about which chain wins (which is the subject of the nalization in § 6).
De nition 5.5. A notarization of block B is an aggregated signature by a majority subset of U on the message B. We call a block signed if it has received at least one signature and notarized if it has received a notarization. A notarized block is a block concatenated with a notarization of itself.
As described in Alg. 1 below, each replica in each round r collects all valid block proposals from all replicas (including from itself) for a xed time frame, the so-called BlockTime. A proposed block B is considered valid for round r if rd B = r and there is a valid block B such that (1) prv B = H (B ) and rd B = rd B − 1, (2) nt B is a notarization of B , (3) dat B is valid. 7 A er BlockTime, the replica signs all highest priority blocks for the current round that it has received and broadcasts a signature message for this block to the entire network.
More than one block can have the highest priority but only if the block maker has equivocated. In this case all equivocated block proposals will get signed. is is not an issue because each honest block makers in the next round will only build on one of the blocks.
e replica continues to sign all highest priority block proposals as it receives more block proposals a er BlockTime. When a notarization for the current round has been observed then the replica advances to the next round.
Algorithm 1 -Block Notarization
Goal: Notarize at least one block for the current round. Wait(BlockTime) 5: while no notarization for round r received do 6: B ← set of all valid round-r block proposals so far 7: for All B ∈ B with minimal rk B do From the description above it should be clear that Algorithm 1 cannot deadlock -even in the presence of an adversary. e fact that each replica continues to sign the highest priority block proposal until a notarization for the current round is observed is su cient to ensure that at least one block gets notarized in the current round. Eventually this will happen because (5.1) holds and the ranking establishes a well-ordering on the set of block proposals. A er observing the rst notarization for the current round it is safe to stop signing because the observed notarization is being re-broadcasted and will eventually reach all honest replicas.
us, all honest replicas will advance to the next round. e above argument relies on propagation assumptions for block proposals and notarizations. We will analyze these in detail, including the relay policies involved, and provide a formal proof for liveness in § 9. 7 Having a validity criteria for dat B is optional and not required for the consensus protocol. Depending on the application of the blockchain, for example, dat B can be con gured to be valid only if dat B represents valid transactions and a valid state transition from dat B . From the perspective of the consensus protocol dat B is arbitrary data.
Honestly signed blocks.
De nition 5.6. A block is called honestly signed if it has received at least one signature from an honest replica.
Note that an honest replica i only issues a signature on a block B if B was the highest priority proposal visible to i at some point in the round a er BlockTime expired.
e concept of honestly signed blocks is a theoretical one, used to argue about the security properties of the notarization protocol. It is not possible to tell if a given signature was issued by an honest or Byzantine replica. Hence it is not observable whether a signed block is an honestly signed block or not.
Timely publication.
De nition 5.7. An artifact of round r was timely published (within d rounds) if it was broadcasted while at least one honest replica was in round ≤ r (resp. in round ≤ r + d).
As a rule, honest replicas re-broadcast every block that they sign. Hence, Only timely published blocks can be honestly signed.
(5.2)
Given a signed block, it is not possible to tell whether the block was timely published or not because it is not possible to tell if the signature was honest or not. is is di erent for notarized blocks as we will explain next. We emphasize that an adversary can withhold its own signatures under an honestly signed block which can lead to a situation where an honestly signed block does not appear to be notarized to the public. However, the adversary can use its own signatures to produce and reveal a notarization at any later point in time. Obviously, in a surviving chain all notarizations are referenced. us, the publication of both block proposals and notarizations is enforced. An adversary cannot build a private chain because a chain can only survive if:
• All its blocks were timely published.
• All its notarizations were timely published within 1 round.
5.4.6 Consensus. We stated above that a chain can only survive if all its notarizations were timely published within 1 round. is means a replica looking at the notarizations of round r can restrict itself to a certain time window. All notarizations for round r received a er that window are necessarily irrelevant for the surviving chains. is fact is the key to the nalization algorithm in § 6 below. See Figure 7 for an example.
ere are multiple ways that this fact can lead to a consensus point. Note that it is not necessary for consensus that a single block gets notarized in a round, nor that a single notarization can get referenced. It is su cient for a consensus point that all notarizations that were received within the time window (indirectly) reference the same block one (or more) rounds back.
Normal operation.
De nition 5.9. A round has normal operation if only one block for that round gets notarized.
Algorithm 1 strives to achieve normal operation by enforcing the BlockTime waiting period, and by giving preference to the highest priority block proposal.
If the highest priority block maker is honest and BlockTime is large enough then the highest priority block proposal will arrive at all honest replicas before BlockTime expires. is means that only one block can get notarized in this round. Hence, assuming that BlockTime is chosen correctly, Algorithm 1 will achieve normal operation in every round in which the highest priority block maker is honest.
We will analyze in detail what it means that BlockTime is "large enough" (see § 9), taking into account the inner workings of the broadcast network such as the relay policy. We will show that if the network traversal time is bounded by ∆ then Alg. 1 is correct if BlockTime ≥ 3∆ (Cor. 9.16, Prop. 9.24, Prop. 9.27).
Note that every round with normal operation creates consensus on the unique block notarized in that round. However, normal operation is a theoretical concept that cannot be observed due to the possibility of notarization withholding. Luckily, as we saw in § 5.4.6, normal operation is not necessary for consensus.
FINALIZATION
Replicas use the nalization procedure described in Alg. 2 to identify points of consensus. For this process, it su ces to observe only the notarized blocks, i.e. block proposals and individual signatures under block proposals can be ignored. e nalization protocol is passive and independent from the notarization protocol. Since it can be carried out by anyone (outside of the replicas) who has access to the notarized blocks, we speak of observers in this section rather than of replicas.
Description
Algorithm 2 makes the assumption that the observer receives all round-(r − 1) notarizations that can get referenced before time T a er having received the rst notarization for round r . is assumption is equivalent to the correctness of Alg. 2 and is proved for all replicas in eorem 9.18.
Algorithm 2 -Finalization
Goal: Build the nalized chain from observing notarized blocks.
B ← incoming notarized block 8: Store B in N rd B r ← r + 1 12: end while
e general idea of Alg. 2 is as follows: We continuously collect all notarized blocks and bucket them according to their round number. Let N r be the bucket for all notarized blocks for round r .
Multiple buckets can be lled concurrently. For example, a second block may go into N r even when N r +1 is already non-empty. However, a block cannot be validated without knowing its predecessor. erefore, we assume that for every pair of blocks that reference each other, the predecessor is processed rst. As a consequence N r must receive its rst element before N r +1 does.
By our initial assumption, for each round r , there is a time when we can rule out the receipt of any further notarized blocks for N r that can get referenced. At that time we " nalize" round r because we know that N r already contains all chain tips that can possibly survive beyond round r . erefore, we can output the longest common pre x C(N r ) as being nal.
Properties of Finalization
We emphasize that there are some notable di erences between the use of BlockTime and T : BlockTime is agreed upon and part of the protocol speci cation, whereas each observer can specify its own T . e notarization protocol requires only BlockTime, not T . e nalization protocol requires only T , not BlockTime. e following assumption about Alg. 2 is called the correctness assumption:
At the time when F (h) is being executed, N h contains all round-h blocks that can get referenced.
(6.1) P 6.1. Suppose (6.1) holds. en the chain C in Alg. 2 is append-only.
e assertion justi es to call the chain C in Alg. 2 nalized.
P . Let C h , C h+1 be the chains returned by F (h) and F (h + 1), respectively, in an execution of Alg. Finalizing blocks. The diagram shows a view of notarized blocks at time T a er rst seeing a notarized block for round r (i.e. at time T a er ending round r and beginning round r + 1). According to the correctness assumption, (6.1), no additional blocks that receive an inbound arrow can appear for the empty positions on the le of the vertical dashed line. Therefore, we mark positions (r − 2, 2) and (r −1, 0) with a cross. The F (r −1) procedure outputs the longest common pre x, marked "FINAL", of all chains de ned by blocks from round r − 1 as their chain tips. As a consequence the blocks marked "DEAD" are now excluded from ever becoming nal.
t. Let t 0 , t 1 be the times when F (h), F (h+1) are called, respectively. By (6.1), none of the blocks added to N h a er t 0 can get referenced. In other words, we have prv(N h+1 ) ⊆ N t 0 h regardless of the time at which N h+1 is considered. us,
We will show that if the network traversal time is bounded by ∆ then (6.1) holds if T ≥ 2∆ ( m. 9.18, Prop. 9.25). Notably, this result does not make any assumptions about BlockTime, i.e. the result holds even if the notaries choose an incorrect value for BlockTime.
ere is alternative version of Alg. 2 which does not require the parameter T . In line 10, instead of calling F (r − 1) at time T from now, the alternative calls F (r − 2) immediately. is can also guarantee (6.1) according to Cor. 9.19 but it requires an assumption about the value of BlockTime used by the notaries.
DECENTRALIZED RANDOMNESS BEACON
e decentralized random beacon protocol (DRB) allows replicas to agree on a veri able random function (VRF) and to jointly produce one new output of the VRF in every round. By a VRF we mean a commitment to a deterministic, pseudo-random sequence (ξ r ) r ≥0 for which each output ξ r is unpredictable given the knowledge of all prior outputs ξ 0 , . . . , ξ r −1 and for which each output ξ r is veri able for correctness by anyone against the commitment. In particular, the VRF outputs are unbiasable due to their deterministic pseudo-random nature. In our decentralized protocol, the output ξ r shall not be predictable by the adversary before at least one honest replica has advanced to round r .
Regarding the threat model, we assume (4.2) for all groups, as stated in Assumption 2. For simplicity of exposition we describe the random beacon protocol for a single group G with |G | = n and n > 2f (G). e protocol can then be adapted to be executed by changing groups as described in § 8.1 below.
Our DRB protocol uses unique t-of-n threshold signatures (see § 7.1) created by the group G as the source of randomness. e adversary cannot predict the outcome of such a signature if f ≤ t −1 and cannot prevent its creation if f ≤ n − t. If the adversary could abort the protocol by preventing a signature from being created, then any restart or fallback mechanism would inevitably introduce bias into the output sequence. 8 We treat the two failures (predicting and aborting) equally. erefore we require t ∈ [f + 1, n − f ]. Note that if we set n = 2t − 1 then both conditions are equivalent to f ≤ t − 1.
e threshold signature scheme used in the DRB protocol is set up using a distributed key generation mechanism (see 7.1.4) which does not rely on trusted parties. We start by providing the background information on threshold cryptography that we use.
Background on reshold Cryptography
7.1.1 Threshold Signatures. In a (t, n)-threshold signature scheme, n parties jointly set up a public key (the group public key) and each party retains an individual secret (the secret key share). A er this setup, t out of the n parties are required and su cient for creating a signature (the group signature) that validates against the group public key.
Non-interactiveness.
A threshold signature scheme is called non-interactive if the process of creating the group signature involves only a single round of one-way communication for each of the t participating parties. Typically in a non-interactive scheme, each participating party creates a signature share using its individual secret and sends this signature share to a third party. Once the third party has received t valid shares it can recover the group signature without any further interaction. For example, ECDSA can be turned into a threshold signature scheme ( [6] ) but it does not have the property of non-interactivity.
Uniqueness.
A signature scheme is called unique if for every message and every public key there is only one signature that validates successfully. is property applies to single signature schemes and threshold signature schemes alike. But in the se ing of a threshold scheme it has the additional requirement that the signature must not depend on the subset of t parties that participated in creating the signature. In other words, in a unique threshold signature scheme, regardless of who signs, the resulting group signature will always be the same.
"Unique" is a property that is strictly stronger than "deterministic". A signature scheme is called deterministic if the signing function does not use randomness. Note that "unique" is a property of the veri cation function whereas "deterministic" is a property of the signing function. Unique implies deterministic but not conversely. For example, DSA and ECDSA can be made deterministic 8 Several existing proposals in the literature are susceptible to bias due to a single party aborting the protocol. For example Algorand [8, § 5.2] describes a fallback mechanism which inevitably introduces bias. RANDAO [1] relies on game-theoretic incentives to keep malicious actors from aborting the protocol. In practice, however, the gain for a malicious actor from biasing the randomness is unbounded whereas the penalty for aborting is bounded. by re-de ning the signing function in a way that it derives its socalled "random k-value" deterministically via a cryptographic hash function from the message plus the secret key instead of choosing it randomly. However, this technique cannot be used to make DSA or ECDSA unique because one cannot expose the k-value to the veri cation function. For a given (t, n) -threshold signature scheme, a DKG protocol allows a set of n parties to collectively generate the keys required for the scheme (i.e. the group public key and the individual secret key shares) without the help of a trusted party.
Distributed Key Generation (DKG).
Note that a DKG protocol is more than a secret sharing protocol. In a secret sharing protocol the secret shares can be used to recover the group secret, but this can be done only once. A er everyone has learned the group secret the shares are not reusable. In a DKG the shares can be used repeatedly for an unlimited number of group signatures without ever recovering the group secret key explicitly.
DKG protocols are relatively straight-forward for discrete-log based cryptosystems and typically utilize multiple instances of a veri able secret sharing protocol (VSS). D uses the "JointFeldman DKG" 9 as described in [7] .
e BLS signature scheme
e only known signature schemes that have a unique, non-interactive threshold version and allow for a practical, e cient DKG are the pairing-based schemes derived from BLS [3] . BLS was introduced by Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham in 2003 and related work can be found in [10] . We shall use the original BLS scheme throughout.
BLS functions.
Assuming we have generated a secret/public key pair (sk, pk), BLS provides the following functions:
(1) Sign(m, sk): Signs message m using secret key sk and returns signature σ . (2) Verify(m, pk, σ ): Veri es the signature σ for message m against the public key pk and returns true or false.
Under the hood, BLS uses a non-degenerate, bilinear pairing
between cyclic subgroups G 1 , G 2 of suitable elliptic curves points with values in a group of units G T . We shall write all groups multiplicatively in this paper. For each group, we x an arbitrary generator: 1 ∈ G 1 , 2 ∈ G 2 , T ∈ G T . We also assume a hash function H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 with values in G 1 . e secret keys are scalars, the public keys are elements of G 2 and the signatures are elements of G 1 .
e function Sign(m, sk) computes H 1 (m) sk and Verify(m, pk, σ ) tests whether e(σ , 2 ) = e(H 1 (m), pk).
Threshold BLS.
We refer to the threshold version of BLS as TBLS. e same functions Sign and Verify that are de ned for BLS also apply to the key/signature shares and group keys/signatures in TBLS. We assume all participating parties in the (t, n)-DKG are 9 It is known from [6] that the adversary can bias the distribution of public keys generated by the Joint-Feldman DKG. However, the bias generally does not weaken the hardness of the DLP for the produced public key ( [6, § 5] ). erefore, with the simplicity of our protocol in mind, we use the original, unmodi ed Joint-Feldman DKG even though variations are available that avoid the bias. numbered 1, . . . , n. A er having run the DKG as in 7.1.4, the (t, n)-TBLS provides additionally the function:
(1) Recover(i 1 , . . . , i t , σ i 1 , . . . , σ i t ): Recover the group signature σ from the signature shares σ i j , j = 1, . . . , t, where σ i j is provided by the party i j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Because of the uniqueness property, the output of Recover does not depend on which t shares from the group are used as inputs.
Recover computes a "Lagrange interpolation" for points in G 1 . e indices i 1 , . . . , i t must be pairwise di erent for the Recover function to succeed.
Randomness Generation
e randomness generation consists of a) a one-time setup in which a DKG is run and b) a repeated signing process in which the outputs are produced. e DKG is slow and requires agreement whereas the repeated signing is non-interactive and fast.
7.3.1 Setup. When se ing up a threshold signature scheme, we do not want to rely on any trusted third party. erefore, the group G runs a DKG for BLS to set up the group public key and the secret key shares during the initialization of the blockchain system. e threshold t is a parameter of the setup.
Once the DKG has nished successfully, it outputs a public veri cation vector V G ∈ G t 2 , and leaves each replica i ∈ G with its secret key share sk G,i . e veri cation vector V G gets commi ed to and recorded in the blockchain, for example in the genesis block.
Let V G = ( 0 , . . . , t −1 ). e group public key is pk G = 0 ∈ G 2 . e secret key sk G corresponding to pk G is not known explicitly to anyone in G but can be used implicitly through sk G,i . e veri cation vector V G can be used to recover the public key share pk G,i ∈ G 2 corresponding to sk G,i via "polynomial" substitution
Hence, all signature shares produced by i can be publicly veri ed against the information V G and i. e group public key pk G can be used to verify the output of Recover.
Signing process.
Recall that a replica enters round r upon seeing the rst notarization for round r − 1. At the beginning of its round r , replica i ∈ G computes the signature share
where ξ r −1 is the random value of round r − 1. To bootstrap, ξ 0 has been set to a nothing-up-my-sleeve number, e.g. the hash of the string "D ". Replica i then broadcasts (i, σ r,i ). Any replica who receives this data can validate (i, σ r,i ) against the public information V G as described in 7.3.1 above. If valid then the replica stores and re-broadcasts (i, σ r,i ). As soon as a replica has received at least t di erent valid signature shares, it runs Recover(i 1 , . . . , i t , σ r,i 1 , . . . , σ r,i t ) to compute the group signature σ G,r . Finally, the random output ξ r for round r is computed as the hash of σ G,r .
We emphasize that the signing process is non-interactive. Any third party can do the recovery a er a one-way communication of su ciently many shares.
SCALABILITY 8.1 reshold Relay
For reasons of scalability the notarization and random beacon protocols from § 5 and § 7 are executed by groups of size n rather than by all replicas in U . Otherwise the message complexity would be unbounded as the total number of replicas grows. e groups, also called commi ees here, are random samples of size n from the whole population U . e group size n is a system parameter that is chosen according to the failure probability analysis of § 4.2.4. A large enough group size ensures that -up to an acceptable failure probability -every group used in the system is honest (Assumption 2).
e mechanism by which D randomly samples replicas into groups, sets the groups up for threshold operation, chooses the current commi ee, and relays from one commi ee to the next is called threshold relay.
Group Derivation.
Let n be the group size. e groups are derived from a random seed ξ where the j-th derived group is
At the start of the system, we choose a number m and a seed ξ and form groups
Each G j runs the DKG described in Section 7.3 to create group keys pk G j which are then stored in the genesis block.
Commi ee
Selection. e sequence (ξ i ) is bootstrapped by de ning an initial value for ξ 0 . en, in round r , we choose
as the commi ee for round r . e same commi ee can be used for the notarization and the random beacon protocols of the same round.
In the random beacon protocol, the members of G (r ) jointly produce the output ξ r , which is then used to select the next commi ee G (r +1) . Since activity is relayed from one group to the next, we call the mechanism "threshold relay".
Open Participation
It is impractical to assume that the set of all replicas is known from the start of the protocol, especially in D 's public chain. is section describes how the protocol adopts an open participation model in which new replicas can join and existing replicas can leave the system.
Epochs.
We divide the rounds into non-overlapping epochs of length l where l is a system parameter and is xed. e block produced in the rst round of each epoch is a registry block (also called key frame) and contains a summary of all new registrations and de-registrations of replicas that happened during the previous epoch that just ended. Note that the summary is a deterministic result of all the blocks in the preceding epoch so that the block maker of the key frame has no opportunity to censor registrations. e rst round of the very rst epoch is DFINITY's genesis block which is also a key frame.
Registration of Replicas.
A replica can request to join the network (i.e. register) or leave the network (i.e. de-register) by submi ing a special transaction for that purpose. e transaction is submi ed to the existing replicas for inclusion in the chain just like any other user transaction. A registration transaction contains the public key of the new replica plus an endorsement proving that it was allowed to form. Depending on the underlying Sybil resistance method, the endorsement is, e.g., the proof of a locked-up stake deposit, the solution to a proof-of-work puzzle tower, or the certi cation by a central, trusted authority.
Registration of
Groups. e random beacon output of the rst round in an epoch e de nes the composition of all the groups that are allowed to newly enter the system during this epoch. A system parameter, m max , governs how many di erent groups can form during an epoch.
Let r be the rst round of epoch e. For each j ≤ m max the jth candidate group is de ned as G = Group(ξ r , j). e members of G run a DKG to establish a group public key pk G . If the DKG succeeds then the members create a registration transaction for G which contains the tuple x = (e, j, pk G ). A er x is signed by a super-majority of G, any member can submit x for inclusion in the blockchain. e validity of the signature under x is publicly veri able against the information already on the blockchain, i.e., the pool U of active replicas and the random beacon output ξ r that de ned the group. A registration transaction x is only valid if it is included in a block that lies within the epoch e.
If the DKG fails or x fails to get a super-majority signature from G or x is not included in the blockchain within epoch e then G cannot register. An adversary can cause the registration to fail. For example, if the super-majority is de ned as a 2 /3-majority then an adversary controlling ≥ 1 /3 of G can deny the signature under x. However, due to variance, this will happen only to some of the group candidates. For example, an adversary controlling < 1 /3 of U will control < 1 /3 in at least half of all groups.
Groups are de-registered automatically when they expire a er a xed number of epochs de ned by a system parameter.
Delayed Activity.
If the registration of a new identity (replica or group) is included in the chain in epoch e, then the newly registered entity becomes active in epoch e + 2. us, there is always a gap of at least l rounds between the registration of a new entity and the rst activity of that new entity. is sequence of events is shown in Fig. 8 .
e gap is required to ensure that all registrations of new entities are nalized before they can be allowed to have any in uence on the random beacon. e minimum value of l can be derived from the growth property of the nalized chain that is proved in Prop. 9.24 below. D uses a value for l that is far greater than the minimum required, because we want to limit the rate at which key frames are produced, in order to reduce load on so-called observing "light clients".
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that the D protocol provides us with a robust and fast distributed public ledger abstraction. Any ledger Figure 8 : Epochs and Registration. e chain is divided into epochs de ned by the round numbers of the blocks. A client joins by submitting a special transaction into a block which also locks up a stake deposit. A group joins by successfully executing a DKG (distributed key generation) and submitting the result as a join transaction into the blockchain. Clients and groups become actively involved in the protocol only a er a gap of at least 1 epoch between their join transaction and their rst activity. must satisfy the following two fundamental properties which we will derive from lower-level properties in § 9.4.
De nition 9.1 (Ledger properties). a) Persistence. Once a transaction is included into the nalized chain of one honest replica, it will then be included in every honest replica's nalized chain. b) Liveness. All transactions originating from honest parties will eventually be included in the nalized chain.
What distinguishes D from other ledgers is the property of near-instant nality. is property is formalized by the following two de nitions and theorem.
De nition 9.2 (Number of Con rmations). We say a transaction has n con rmations if it is contained in a notarized block B r and there is a chain of notarized blocks of the form (. . . , B r , . . . , B r +n−1 ).
Note that the de nition refers to any notarized blocks known to the replica, not necessarily nalized blocks.
. Under normal operation in round r , every transaction included in a block for round r is nal a er two con rmations plus the maximum network roundtrip time 2∆.
From the perspective of an arbitrary observer, the Main eorem means the following. Suppose an observer sees a transaction x that has received two con rmations, i.e. a notarized block B r for round r containing x and another notarized block B r +1 with prv B r +1 = B r . If round r experienced normal operation then, at time 2∆ a er the observer received the notarization for B r +1 , the nalization algorithm (Alg. 2) is guaranteed to append B r to the observer's nal chain. We assume here that T in Alg. 2 is set to 2∆. e proof of the Main eorem will occupy § 9.3 below.
We will provide proofs for the synchronous model where an upper bound for the network traversal time ∆ is known. We assume that processing times for messages are included in the network traversal time.
Broadcast and Processing
e security analysis must take into account the behavior of the broadcast network, which implements a gossip protocol. In particular, the relay policy that is applied to gossiping is going to be essential for the provability of our results.
Replicas continuously receive new protocol artifacts, e.g. block proposals, signatures under block proposals, notarizations, notarized blocks or random beacon outputs. As soon as an artifact is determined to be valid it is immediately relayed ("gossiped") to the replica's peers if it falls under the relay policy de ned below.
De nition 9.4 (Relay Policy). All honest replicas relay the following artifacts a) for the current round: valid block proposals and valid signatures under block proposals, b) for any round: notarizations and notarized blocks.
We say an artifact has saturated the network if it has been received by all honest replicas.
We emphasize that saturating the network is a global condition that is only of theoretical value in our security arguments. e replicas cannot observe whether an artifact has saturated the network or not. Saturating the network does not constitute a reliable broadcast.
Artifacts can be received out of order, e.g. a signature or a notarization for a block can be received before the block. If an artifact x is received before an artifact that is referenced by x then x can not be validated. For this reason, all honest replicas rst queue any incoming artifact x until all artifacts referenced by x have also been received. Only then is x processed. In particular, an honest replica i relays an artifact x only if it possesses all artifacts referenced by x. Hence, a peer j of i who receives x from i can then request any artifact that is referenced by x that j does not already possess. is is an artifact synchronization process which happens transparently in the background and is completed before j processes x. erefore, throughout the paper, we take for granted that if an artifact x is received then all artifacts referenced by x have also been received.
Signatures under block proposals are collected in a background process and, once a majority is available for a given block proposal, are aggregated into a notarization which is then treated in the same way as if it was received from outside. Block proposals and notarizations are collected in the background and made available to Alg. 1 and 2.
Our relay policy and network assumptions (see § 9.2.1 below) guarantee the following property:
Any artifact that falls under b) and is processed by an honest replica will eventually saturate the network.
(9.1) Property (9.1) does not hold for artifacts relayed under policy a) because a replica in the middle of the broadcast path may have advanced to the next round in which case the artifact will be considered old and will be dropped. Suppose an honest replica i has processed a block proposal B and considered it valid. en i must possess prv B and a notarization of prv B. We emphasize that the honest replica i re-broadcasts the notarized block prv B in this case. By (9.1), this behavior guarantees:
If a block B is honestly signed then the notarized block prv B eventually saturates the network. 
Timing and Progress
is section makes statements about the relative timing of events that happen at di erent replicas. We do not assume normal operation in any round and therefore have to consider the possibility of multiple notarizations z r , z r , . . . being created and broadcasted for the same round r .
Preliminaries.
We assume that a message broadcasted by an honest replica at time t reaches every honest replica before t + ∆ (i.e. at a time < t + ∆). Since processing times are not in the scope of our analysis, we assume all processing times to be zero. is applies to the creation as well as to the validation of all messages including block proposals, signatures, notarizations, random beacon shares, and random beacon outputs. As a consequence, for example, when a replica i receives a random beacon output ξ r at time t then it broadcasts its block proposal for round r at the same time t. Or, when a random beacon member i receives a notarization z r for round r at time t then i broadcasts its random beacon share for round r + 1 immediately at the same time t.
De nition 9.5. Let τ i (A) denote the time at which replica i sees event A where A is one of the following: a random beacon output ξ r , a block proposal B r , or a notarization z r . We set τ i (r ) := τ i (z r −1 ) where z r −1 is the rst notarization for round r − 1 that i receives.
us, τ i (r ) is the time when replica i enters round r . To study when the rst honest or last honest replica sees an event, we de ne:
De nition 9.6. For example, τ(r ) is the time when the rst honest replica enters round r andτ (r ) is the time when the last honest replica enters round r . Finally, it is also of interest when an event can rst be seen or constructed by the adversary. erefore, we de ne:
For example, τ * (ξ r ) is the earliest time that the adversary can construct the random beacon output ξ r .
We will prove in Cor. 9.16 below that the protocol makes continuous progress, i.e. that all values τ i (r ) are nite. As the reader may verify, the statements made in this section up until Cor. 9.16 also hold (trivially) in the case that any of the values τ i (A) are in nite. L 9.8. For all rounds r we have:
and, for any round-r event A under Def. 9.4a),
P . Let i be an honest replica and let z r −1 be a notarization for round r − 1 such that τ i (z r −1 ) = τ(r ). By Def. 9.4b), z r −1 is relayed across the network and reaches any other honest replica j by τ i (r ) + ∆. is proves (9.3). Now let A be any event that falls under the relay policy in Def. 9.4a) for round r . If τ(A) + ∆ ≤ τ(r + 1) then the same argument applies. Indeed, the assumption means that all replicas along the broadcast path will still be in round r , thus will relay A according to Def. 9.4a). is proves (9.4). e inequality (9.5) means that at least one honest replica is required before anyone can see a notarization z r for round r . P 9.10 (M P ). Suppose BlockTime ≥ ∆. en the round number of any honest replica increases at most every BlockTime − ∆. Moreover, at any point in time, the di erence between the round numbers of two honest replicas can be at most 1.
Maximal Progress.
P
. From (9.3) and (9.5) together we get:
is implies both statements.
For all rounds r and any round-r event A under Def. 9.4a) we have:
e interpretation is that if a round-r event is broadcasted by τ(r )+(BlockTime−∆) then it is guaranteed to saturate the network, and this happens by τ(r ) + BlockTime.
. From τ(A) ≤ τ(r ) + (BlockTime − ∆) we conclude Figure 9 : Events Timings. Let replica i be the rst honest replica to enter round r , at time τ i (r ) = τ (r ), upon receipt (or construction) of a notarization z r −1 for round r − 1. Let j be any other honest replica for illustration. Replica i broadcasts z r −1 to everyone where it arrives before τ (r ) + ∆. Thus, all honest replicas start their round r before τ (r ) + ∆. Immediately a er starting round r , all honest random beacon members create and broadcast their random beacon share to everyone where it arrives before τ (r ) + 2∆. Immediately a er receiving ξ r , each honest block maker broadcasts its block proposals B r to everyone where it arrives before τ (r ) + 3∆. Replica i nishes its waiting period at τ i (r )+BlockTime = τ (r )+3∆ and proceeds to sign the highest priority proposal B r in its view. Replica j nishes its waiting period later, at τ j (r ) + BlockTime, and does the same.
Normal Operation.
L 9.12 (B , "S " B ). For all rounds r we have:
P . Each honest random beacon member i broadcasts its random beacon share for ξ r at τ i (r ) (cf. § 7.3.2). us, any other honest replica will receive all honest random beacon shares for ξ r byτ (r ) + ∆ and thus will recover ξ r by that time, i.e. τ (ξ r ) ≤τ (r ) + ∆. e assertion follows a er applying (9.3).
We now assume BlockTime ≥ 3∆ for the rest of the subsection. e timing of events with BlockTime = 3∆ is illustrated in Fig. 9 . L 9.13 (B , "S " B ). Suppose BlockTime ≥ 3∆.
For each round r and each honest block proposal B r we have:
. Since B r is proposed by an honest replica i, it is broadcasted immediately when i receives ξ r . (Note that we generally ignore processing times throughout the section, including the block creation time.) is means τ(B r ) ≤τ (ξ r ), hence τ(B r ) ≤τ (ξ r ) (9.7) ≤ τ(r ) + 2∆ ≤ τ(r ) + (BlockTime − ∆). e assertion follows from Cor. 9.11 for A = B r . P 9.14 (N O ). Suppose BlockTime ≥ 3∆. If the highest priority replica in round r is honest, then round r has normal operation.
P
. Let i be the highest priority replica of round r and suppose i is honest. en i proposes exactly one block B r for round r . Lemma 9.13 implies that for each honest notary member j we have τ j (B r ) ≤ τ j (r ) + BlockTime. By Alg. 1, replica j waits BlockTime a er entering round r and then signs B r and only B r because B r 's proposer i has the highest possible priority.
Since notarization requires the participation of at least one honest replica, and all honest replicas sign only B r , B r is the only block that can possibly get notarized. In other words, round r can only be ended by a notarization of B r , which guarantees that the signatures under B r saturate the network and B r indeed gets notarized.
9.2.4 Minimal Progress. For each time x ≥ x 0 , we consider the set S x of valid block proposals for round r that have been received by at least one honest replica. More formally, S x consists of those valid round-r proposals B that satisfy τ(B) ≤ x. For example, B r ∈ S x 0 . We then de ne
For x ≥ x 0 , the function f has values in the non-negative integers and is monotonically decreasing. Since f (x 0 ) ≤ d, it follows that there is a time
We claim τ(r + 1) ≤ x 1 + 2∆. is proves (9.9) since
If a notarization for a block di erent from B arrives at any replica before x 1 + 2∆ then the claim is already proven. We assume w.l.o.g. that this is not the case. Note that under this assumption, (9.4) applies to the events B and any signature under B. Let B ∈ S x 1 with rk B = f (x 1 ). Since B ∈ S x 1 we have τ(B) ≤ x 1 . Hence, by (9.4),τ (B) ≤ x 1 + ∆. e factsτ (B) ≤ x 1 + ∆ and rk B = f (x 1 + ∆) together mean that B has minimal rank in every honest replica's view at time x 1 + ∆. Also, x 1 + ∆ ≥ τ(r ) + BlockTime + ∆ ≥τ (r ) + BlockTime, i.e. x 1 + ∆ is past the BlockTime waiting period for every honest replica. us, all honest replicas have broadcasted a signature for B by x 1 + ∆. By (9.4), all honest replicas receive f + 1 signatures by x 1 + 2∆, i.e. τ (r + 1) ≤ x 1 + 2∆.
We remark without proof: In the case d = 0 the bound can be improved to τ(r + 1) ≤ τ(r ) + BlockTime + ∆. e resulting bounds are then strict for all d.
As a corollary, by induction, we conclude that the protocol makes continuous progress: C 9.16. Suppose BlockTime ≥ 3∆. For all rounds r and all honest replicas i, τ i (r ) is nite.
Near-Instant Finality
Finality is provided by Alg. 1. is section rst proves the correctness of this algorithm and then shows as the main theorem that nality is achieved quickly under normal operation. Recall:
• According to the relay policy the notarization will reach all other honest replicas.
• As was stated in (9.2), if a block is honestly signed then the notarized previous block will saturate the network.
• if a block is honestly signed then nt B is re-broadcasted under the policy Def. 9.4b). L 9.17. Suppose z r −1 is a referenced notarization for round r − 1. en,τ (z r −1 ) ≤τ (r + 1) + ∆. (9.10) P . Let B r be a notarized block with nt B r = z r −1 . Since B r received an honest signature, we have τ(B r ) ≤τ (r + 1). Since B r contains z r −1 , we have τ(z r −1 ) ≤ τ(B r ).
is impliesτ (z r −1 ) ≤ τ(z r −1 ) + ∆ ≤τ (r + 1) + ∆.
T
9.18 (C F ). Suppose T ≥ 2∆. For every honest replica, before the replica executes F (h) in Algorithm 2 it has received all notarizations for round h that can get referenced.
e assertion is precisely the correctness assumption (6.1).
P
. Suppose z r −1 is a referenced notarization for round r −1. From (9.10) and (9.3), we get τ (z r −1 ) ≤ τ(r + 1) + 2∆.
(9.11)
In particular, for any honest replica i, τ i (z r −1 ) ≤ τ i (r + 1) + 2∆. (9.12) is shows that any notarization for round r −1 that arrives at i a er τ i (r +1)+2∆ cannot get referenced. Since Alg. 2 calls F (r −1) at time τ i (r + 1) + T and T ≥ 2∆, this proves the claim. Provided that BlockTime ≥ 2∆, (9.13) provides an alternative criteria for when to execute F (r − 1) in Alg. 2 that does not require T . Instead of waiting for T into round r + 1, the nalization procedure can simply wait for round r + 1 to end in the observer's view.
T
9.20 (M T ). Under normal operation in round r , every transaction included in a block for round r is nal for an observer a er two con rmations plus the maximum network roundtrip time 2∆. P T 9.3. Suppose round r has normal operation, i.e. only one block B r gets notarized for round r . We assume the observer has chosen T = 2∆. At time T a er seeing a notarization for round r + 1, the observer will nalize round r . Since N r (the bucket of all received notarized blocks for round r ) contains only B r , B r is appended to the nal chain at this time.
Chain Properties
Recall that each replica at the end of each round has its own view of an append-only nalized chain (cf. Alg. 2). We consider the following properties regarding state and content of the nalized chain C.
De nition 9.21 (Chain properties). a) Growth with parameter k. Each honest replica's nalized chain at the end of their round r has length ≥ r − k. b) Consistency. If C, C are the nalized chains of two honest parties, taken at any point in time, then C is a pre x of C or vice versa. c) ality with parameter l and µ. Out of any l consecutive blocks from the nalized chain of an honest replica, at least µl blocks were proposed by an honest replica. P 9.22. Persistence follows from the properties of chain consistency and chain growth.
P . Suppose a transaction is included in the nalized chain of one honest replica i, say in the block at round r . Given any other honest replica j, by the growth property, j's nalized chain will eventually reach length r as well. At that point, the consistency property guarantees that j's block at round r is identical to the one in i's nalized chain. P 9.23. Liveness follows from the properties of chain quality and chain growth. P . A transaction originating from an honest replica is picked up by all other honest parties and included in their block proposals. 10 e growth property guarantees that the nalized chain will eventually grow arbitrarily long. e chain quality property applies and guarantees that there will eventually be a block in the nalized chain that was proposed by an honest replica.
9.4.1 Chain Growth. Accepting a failure probability of ρ, the Chain Growth property holds with parameter k = − log β ρ . P . We rst look at the property assuming normal operation in round r . In this case, the chain will be nalized up to and including round r at the end of round r + 1 plus 2∆ according to Alg. 2. In terms of round numbers, based on Proposition 9.10, each round including round r + 2 takes at least BlockTime − ∆ > 2∆, thus at the end of round r + 2, we can nalize round r so that the nalized chain will have length r + 1. is means the property holds with k = 1.
Whenever the highest priority block maker for r is honest then round r has normal operation (Prop. 9.14). us, in general, normal operation happens with probability at least 1 − 1/β. en, with probability at least 1 − (1/β) k the property holds with parameter k.
us, if we equate this probability with the minimal desired success probability of 1 − ρ and solve for k we get k = − log β ρ . 9.4.2 Chain Consistency. P 9.25 (C C ). Suppose T ≥ 2∆. Suppose two honest replicas i, i output the nalized chains C, C upon executing F (h), F (h ), respectively. en C ≤ C or C ≤ C.
P
. Assume w.l.o.g h ≤ h. Let N h , N h be the sets of Algorithm 2 at the time when F (h) is being executed by i, i , respectively. Since h ≤ h, by Prop. 6.1, C ≤ C(N h ). Let X be the set of all round-h notarizations that can get referenced. Note that X is globally de ned a er all honest replicas have ended their round h + 1 (though X is not known to anyone). By m. 9.18 (correctness of nalization), we have X ⊆ N h , N h . e set X is furthermore non-empty because F (h) is only called once some round-h notarizations are actually referenced. Hence, C = C(N h ) ≤ C(X ) and C ≤ C(N h ) ≤ C(X ).
e fact that C, C are pre xes of a common chain proves the claim.
Chain
ality. Whether the highest priority replica in round r is adversarial can be modelled as a Bernoulli trial X r with success probability f (U )/|U |. Since the adversary cannot bias the random beacon, the trials X r for di erent r are independent. erefore, an execution of the protocol comes with a Bernoulli process X 1 , X 2 , . . . that models the success of the adversary in gaining preference on the proposed block.
Following Garay et.al. [5] , we de ne an execution of the protocol as typical if the Bernoulli process does not deviate too much from its expectation. For any set of rounds S we de ne the random variable X (S) := i ∈S X i .
De nition 9.26. An execution is (ϵ, η)-typical if, for any set S of consecutive rounds with |S | ≥ η, X (S) − E(X (S)) E(X (S)) < ϵ e idea is that a) we can guarantee chain quality in all typical executions, and b) any execution is typical with all but negligible probability. In practice, "negligible probability" is de ned by the security parameter κ and the parameters ϵ, η are a function of κ. In a (ϵ, η)-typical execution the Chain ality property holds for µ = (1 − 1/β)(1 − ϵ) and l = η.
P
. Whenever X r = 0 there will be only one notarization for r (Prop. 9.14). is notarization will be for the honest proposer's block, so the honest proposal is guaranteed to be in the nalized chain. erefore the chain quality is at least (1 − 1/β)(1 − ϵ) for a (ϵ, η)-typical execution if l ≥ η.
